Abstract. This paper studies Dawid's prequential framework from the point of view of the algorithmic theory of randomness. The main result is that two natural notions of randomness coincide. One notion is the prequential version of the standard definition due to Martin-Löf, and the other is the prequential version of the martingale definition of randomness due to Schnorr. This is another manifestation of the close relation between the two main paradigms of randomness, typicalness and unpredictability. The algorithmic theory of randomness can be stripped of the algorithms and still give meaningful results; the typicalness paradigm then corresponds to Kolmogorov's measure-theoretic probability and the unpredictability paradigm corresponds to game-theoretic probability. It is an open problem whether the main result of this paper continues to hold in the stripped version of the theory.
Introduction
The two fundamental paradigms of randomness are unpredictability and typicalness (see, e.g., [1] , Chapter 1). Unpredictability is based on the idea of gambling: a sequence is regarded random if there is no computable way to become infinitely rich betting on its elements. Typicalness is based on the idea of measure: a sequence is regarded random if there is no computable way to specify a set of measure zero containing this sequence. The standard formal definition of unpredictability is due to Schnorr [19] and Levin [12] , and the standard formal definition of typicalness is due to Martin-Löf [14] . Schnorr and Levin [19, 12] also established equivalence between unpredictability and typicalness.
The standard definitions of randomness are given relative to a stochastic mechanism supposedly generating the sequence. In this paper we ask the question whether the equivalence will still hold in the "prequential framework", i.e., when no such stochastic mechanism is assumed.
The first prequential definition of randomness was proposed by Dawid [4] . Dawid's definition, however, was based on von Mises's idea of subsequence selection rules, which Ville [22] showed to be inadequate in some important respects. Dawid ([4] , Section 13.2) also gave a brief description of a prequential definition based on Ville's martingales, but did not elaborate on it. This paper provides the details of this definition, which belongs to the unpredictability paradigm. It also gives a Bayesian definition of typicalness. Its main mathematical result says that the prequential notions of unpredictability and typicalness coincide.
Prequential framework for randomness
Set Π := ([0, 1] × {0, 1})
∞ ; this will sometimes be referred to as the prequential space. A typical element (p 1 , y 1 , p 2 , y 2 , . . .) of Π is interpreted as the record of predictions p 1 , p 2 , . . . output by a forecaster and the observed outcomes y 1 , y 2 , . . ., assumed binary. Intuitively, p n is the forecaster's subjective probability that y n = 1 after having observed y 1 , . . . , y n−1 and taking account of all other information available at the time of issuing the forecast.
Dawid's prequential principle ([3] ; it is called "M2" in [4] and "weak prequential principle" in [6, 7] ) says that our evaluation of the quality of the forecasts p 1 , p 2 , . . . in light of the observed outcomes y 1 , y 2 , . . . should not depend on the forecaster's probability model (typically, a probability measure describing the forecaster's beliefs about the stochastic mechanism generating the data). The prequential principle is satisfied automatically in our framework, since the prequential space does not involve the forecaster's probability model at all.
In the following two sections we will introduce two different notions of randomness of a sequence π ∈ Π. Intuitively, (p 1 , y 1 , p 2 , y 2 , . . .) is random if the p n are good predictions of y n ; slightly more precisely, if there is no computable way to detect inadequacy of p n . The first definition, in Section 2, belongs to the unpredictability paradigm and the second, in Section 3, to the typicalness paradigm. The equivalence between the two definitions, which is the main result of the paper, is stated in Section 4 and proved in Section 5. The concluding Section 6 discusses directions for further research.
For understanding the intuitive meaning of our statements, the following intuitive idea of lower semicontinuity will suffice: a function f : X → R is lower semicomputable if there is an algorithm that, for all x ∈ X and r ∈ R, will eventually tell us that f (x) > r if this inequality is indeed true. (Lower semicomputable functions are not necessarily computable as the algorithm can work arbitrarily long.) Understanding the proofs requires precise definitions, as given in, e.g., Appendix A.
Some other notation
The set of all natural (i.e., positive integer) numbers is denoted N, N := {1, 2, . . .}; N is N extended by adding ∞. As always, Q and R are the sets of all rational and real numbers, respectively.
Let Ω := {0, 1} ∞ be the set of all infinite binary sequences and Ω := {0, 1} * be the set of all finite binary sequences. Set Π := ([0, 1] × {0, 1}) * . The empty element (sequence of length zero) of both Ω and Π will be denoted 2. In our applications, the elements of Π will be finite sequences of predictions and outcomes, and the elements of Ω and Ω will be sequences of outcomes (infinite or finite).
For x ∈ Ω , let Γ x ⊆ Ω be the set of all infinite continuations of x. Similarly, for x ∈ Π , Γ x ⊆ Π is the set of all infinite continuations of x. For each ω = (y 1 , y 2 , . . .) ∈ Ω and n ∈ N, set ω n := (y 1 , . . . , y n ). Similarly, for each π = (p 1 , y 1 , p 2 , y 2 , . . .) ∈ Π and n ∈ N, set π n := (p 1 , y 1 , . . . , p n , y n ).
Unpredictability
A farthingale is a function V :
for all n and all (p 1 , y 1 , p 2 , y 2 , . . .) ∈ Π. If we replace "=" by "≥" in (1), we get the definition of superfarthingales. These are prequential versions of the standard notions of martingale and supermartingale; we are following the terminology of [7] . The value of a farthingale can be interpreted as the capital of a gambler betting according to the odds announced by the forecaster. In the case of superfarthingales, the gambler is allowed to throw away part of his capital. Lemma 1. Let V be the class of all non-negative lower semicomputable superfarthingales V with initial value V (2) = 1. There exists a largest superfarthingale in V to within a constant factor.
Proof. Fix a universal sequence of lower semicomputable functions f 1 , f 2 , . . . on Π (see Lemma 6 in Appendix A). It is easy to construct a new computable sequence of semicontinuous functions f 1 , f 2 , . . . such that each of f l is a superfarthingale in V and that f l = f l whenever f l is already in V, l ∈ N. Then ∞ l=1 2 −l f l will be a largest superfarthingale in V.
Let us fix a largest superfarthingale U in V and call it the universal superfarthingale. A sequence π ∈ Π is unpredictable if U (π n ) stays bounded as n → ∞. The following lemma gives an equivalent definition of unpredictable sequences.
Lemma 2.
A sequence π ∈ Π is unpredictable if and only if U (π n ) does not tend to infinity as n → ∞.
Proof. Following the proof of Lemma 3.1 in [21] , we can construct a superfar-
is a superfarthingale; it is clear that it is lower semicomputable and so belongs to V. Since U 1 , U 2 , . . . is a computable sequence of lower semicontinuous functions, we can set
Typicalness
We can also adapt the standard definition of typicalness to the prequential framework. First we give an informal version of the definition. A forecasting system is a function φ : Ω → [0, 1]. Let Φ be the set of all forecasting systems. For each φ ∈ Φ there exists a unique probability measure
(In other words, such that φ(x) is a version of the conditional probability, according to P φ , that x will be followed by 1.) The notion of a forecasting system is close to that of a probability measure on Ω: the correspondence φ → P φ becomes an isomorphism if we only consider forecasting systems taking values in the open interval (0, 1) and probability measures taking positive values on the sets Γ x , x ∈ Ω .
Informally, we say that a sequence ω ∈ Ω is typical w.r. to a forecasting system φ if it is typical (i.e., random in the sense of Martin-Löf [14] ) w.r. to P φ when φ is given as an oracle. We will formalize "given as an oracle" using some simplest notions of effective topology (see Appendix A). The following definition is a version of Levin's "uniform test of randomness" [13, 9] . Definition 1. A uniform test of typicalness is a lower semicomputable function T : Ω × Φ → N such that, for all φ ∈ Φ and all m ∈ N,
Intuitively, T (ω, φ) is the number of anomalies (measured in bits, according to (2)) discovered in ω w.r. to φ. The requirement of lower semicomputability means that the anomalies have to be genuine: a discovery of anomaly can never be undone.
for the φ-cut of G. A convenient alternative representation of a test of typicalness T is as a computable sequence of nested open sets
for all φ ∈ Φ and m ∈ N. It is easy to see that the representations are indeed equivalent: when given T we can set G m := {(ω, φ) | T (ω, φ) ≥ m}, and when given
. . will also be referred to as tests of typicalness (dropping the word "uniform"). Let G l,m be a universal computable family of sequences of open sets (cf.
is a computable family of nested sequences of open sets containing all nested computable sequences of open sets. We can further "trim" each G l,m to G l,m so that:
. . is a non-decreasing sequence of simple sets whose union is G l,m . Remember that, by (15) ,
is established. The open set G l,m is defined as the union of the H K that are cleared. Let us check that condition (4) can indeed be eventually established by a computable procedure when it is satisfied. Suppose (4) is satisfied. The set
is effectively open, so that we can effectively generate a sequence of basic sets U k ⊆ Φ whose union is S. By the compactness of Φ, already a finite number of U k will cover S when S = Φ, and so (4) can be established in a computable manner.
Therefore, we can list all tests of typicalness, in the following sense: there is a computable sequence (G l,m ) ∞ m=1 , l = 1, 2, . . ., of tests of typicalness that contains all "strict" tests of typicalness (i.e., those satisfying the required inequality with "<" instead of "≤"). To obtain a largest test of typicalness G m , it suffices to set
Indeed, the computability of the sequence of open sets G m is obvious,
and, for each l ∈ N,
where T is the functional representation of the test (G m )
Let us fix a largest uniform test of typicalness T and call it the universal test of typicalness. A sequence ω ∈ Ω is said to be typical w.r. to φ ∈ Φ if T (ω, φ) < ∞.
Definition 2. We say that π = (p 1 , y 1 , p 2 , y 2 , . . .) ∈ Π is typical if there exists a forecasting system φ such that (y 1 , y 2 , . . .) is typical w.r. to φ and φ agrees with π, in the sense that p n = φ(y 1 , . . . , y n−1 ) for all n. This theorem will be proved in the next section. The proof will be based on Levin's [13] ideas (see also [9] ).
Main result
The philosophical significance of Theorem 1 is that it establishes the equivalence of the purely prequential and Bayesian viewpoints in the framework of the algorithmic theory of randomness. The definition of typicalness is Bayesian, in that the forecaster is modelled as a coherent decision maker, computing his forecasts by conditioning a probability measure; rejecting the forecasts is the same as rejecting all probability measures that could have produced those forecasts. The definition of unpredictability is purely prequential, in that it does not see any probability measures behind the forecasts; the latter are used for testing directly.
A simple corollary of Theorem 1 is the following observation:
Corollary 1. Let φ be a computable forecasting system. A binary sequence (y 1 , y 2 , . . .) is random w.r. to P φ in the sense of Martin-Löf if and only if the sequence (p 1 , y 1 , p 2 , y 2 , . . .) is unpredictable (equivalently, typical), where p n := φ(y 1 , . . . , y n−1 ), n ∈ N.
Therefore, the prequential notions of unpredictability and typicalness generalize Martin-Löf's notion of randomness.
Remark 1. Notice that we have never assumed that the past observations y 1 , . . . , y n−1 are the only information available to the forecaster when choosing the prediction p n for the next outcome y n . The forecaster is allowed to (and typically does) use all kinds of "side information" in addition to the past observations. It is easy to extend all our definitions and results to the case where some of this side information, x n , is also known to the gambler. (As in [4] , Section 9.) As an example, the definition of a superfarthingale, (1), becomes p 1 , y 1 , . . . , x n−1 , p n−1 , y n−1 , x n , p n , 1).
Remark 2. Since we do not record side information in the main part of this paper, the forecasting systems that we consider are never assumed computable: even if the forecaster computes each forecast from the past outcomes and the side information, typically the forecast cannot be computed from the past outcomes alone. It is not even obvious that the notion of a forecasting system φ as we defined it (a function of past outcomes) is meaningful. It involves the following controversial picture along the lines of Pearl's "local surgeries". To elicit the value of the function φ on a binary sequence y 1 , . . . , y n , we act as follows. First we wait until the nature produces the first piece of side information x 1 and, in response, the forecaster produces p 1 . Then we perform a "local surgery" replacing the nature's outcome by y 1 (if it is different from y 1 ). Now the nature produces x 2 and the forecaster produces p 2 . Another local surgery replaces the outcome by y 2 . Etc. Finally, the forecaster produces p n , which is taken to be the value of φ on y 1 , . . . , y n . 
for all (y 1 , . . . , y n ) ∈ Ω . Therefore, p 1 = 1/2, y n is obtained by tossing a biased coin so that y n = 1 with probability p n , n = 1, 2, . . ., and p n = 1/3 or p n = 2/3 according to whether y n−1 = 0 or y n−1 = 1, n = 2, 3, . . . . When will the universal test of typicalness declare such a sequence untypical? Of course, this will always happen if the test is given the sequence of forecasts (p 1 , p 2 , . . .): the sequence of outcomes (y 1 , y 2 , . . .) is computable from (p 1 , p 2 , . . .) (y 1 is determined by p 2 , y 2 is determined by p 3 , etc.) but the set {(y 1 , y 2 , . . .)} has measure zero. According to our definition of typicalness at the end of Section 3, for the sequence (p 1 , y 1 , p 2 , y 2 , . . .) to be typical there should exist a forecasting system φ such that p 1 , p 2 , . . . are produced by φ along the sequence (y 1 , y 2 , . . .) and such that (y 1 , y 2 , . . .) is typical w.r. to φ. This works because we can choose a φ that "hides" (p 1 , p 2 , . . .) very well: the Markov forecasting system (5) will do so. The quantifier "exist" is essential: it cannot be replaced by "for all". In particular, we cannot take as φ Dawid's ( [5] , Section 7.3) prequential model
The problem is that the prequential model is too honest and does not try to hide the p n at all; consequently, T ((y 1 , y 2 , . . .), φ preq ) = ∞, where T is the universal test of typicalness. This is a manifestation of the fact that the universal test of typicalness violates Dawid's strong prequential principle [6, 7] , which recommends, roughly, the following procedure for testing agreement between (p 1 , p 2 , . . .) and (y 1 , y 2 , . . .). Choose a test of typicalness T (ω, φ) that depends on (ω, φ) only via (ω, φ(ω)), where φ(ω) is the sequence of forecasts made by φ on ω (cf. (7) in the proof of Theorem 1 below). There might be some restrictions (regarded as mild in a given context) on the class of forecasting systems φ considered. Now the disagreement between (p 1 , p 2 , . . .) and (y 1 , y 2 , . . .) can be defined as T (ω, φ) being large, where φ is any forecasting system that agrees with (p 1 , y 1 , p 2 , y 2 , . . .). It does not matter which φ is chosen; e.g., the prequential model will do.
Proof of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
The proof of the theorem will depend on a fundamental result called Ville's inequality. Let φ be a forecasting system. A martingale w.r. to φ is a function
for all x ∈ Ω . If we replace "=" by "≥" (respectively, "≤") in (6), we get the definition of a supermartingale (respectively, submartingale) w.r. to φ.
Proposition 1 (Ville's inequality, [22] , p. 100). If φ is a forecasting system, V is a non-negative supermartingale w.r. to φ with initial value V (2) = 1, and C > 0,
Fix π ∈ Π.
Part "if " of Theorem 1
Suppose π is not unpredictable. Then π ∈ G m for all m ∈ N, where
and U is the universal superfarthingale. We will not distinguish between (p 1 , y 1 , p 2 , y 2 , . . .) ∈ Π and the pair of sequences ((p 1 , p 2 , . . .), (y 1 , y 2 
The mapping (ω, φ) → φ(ω) from Ω × Φ to [0, 1] ∞ is continuous. Therefore, the mapping (ω, φ) → (φ(ω), ω) from Ω × Φ to Π is also continuous. Therefore, the set
Let us check that G m is a test of typicalness. The computability requirement is obvious. Fix m ∈ N and φ ∈ Φ. To check (3) is a martingale w.r. to φ. Now Ville's inequality implies
Suppose π is not only unpredictable but also typical. Then there exists φ ∈ Φ such that π = (φ(ω), ω) for some ω typical w.r. to φ. Since π ∈ G m , we have (ω, φ) ∈ G m ; since this is true for each m ∈ N, ω is not typical w.r. to φ, and so we have arrived at a contradiction.
Corollary 1
To see that a sequence ω = (y 1 , y 2 , . . .) ∈ Ω is random w.r. to P φ in the sense of Martin-Löf if and only if π := (p 1 , y 1 , p 2 , y 2 , . . .) is unpredictable, where p n := φ(y 1 , . . . , y n−1 ), n ∈ N, notice that the unpredictability of π is equivalent to Schnorr and Levin's reformulation of Martin-Löf randomness of ω w.r. to P φ (i.e., to the universal lower semicomputable supermartingale w.r. to φ being bounded on ω n ).
Part "only if " of Theorem 1
Let G m = ∪{U k | (m, k) ∈ A} be a representation of the universal test of typicalness via basic sets, with A ⊆ N 2 a recursively enumerable set. Without loss of generality we can assume that each basic set U k in this representation has the form Γ c × φ ∈ Φ | a(x) < φ(x) < b(x), ∀x ∈ Ω ≤n for some c ∈ Ω n , a, b : Ω ≤n → Q, and n ∈ N. Define G m to be the set of all (p 1 , y 1 , p 2 , y 2 , . . .) ∈ Π such that ((y 1 , y 2 , . . .), φ) ∈ G m for all φ that agree with (p 1 , y 1 , p 2 , y 2 , . . .).
The compactness of Φ easily implies that each set G m ⊆ Π is open. Indeed, suppose π = (p 1 , y 1 , p 2 , y 2 , . . .) ∈ G m . For each φ ∈ Φ, either φ disagrees with π or ((y 1 , y 2 , . . .) , φ) ∈ G m . In both cases there is a neighbourhood O φ of π and a neighbourhood O φ of φ such that either all elements of O φ disagree with all elements of O φ or ((y 1 , y 2 , . . .) , φ ) ∈ G m for all (p 1 , y 1 , p 2 , y 2 , . . .) ∈ O φ and all φ ∈ O φ . Since Φ is compact, there is a finite set φ 1 , . . . , φ J such that ∪ 
(For example, we can set N to the largest n k in (14) over k such that (m, k) ∈ A i .) For n ≥ N and x ∈ Π n , set
After that proceed by backward induction. If W i (x) is already defined for x ∈ Π n , n = N, N − 1, . . . , 1, set, for each x ∈ Π n−1 ,
It is clear that W i is a superfarthingale that does not depend on the choice of N .
We will need to establish several properties of W i . First, it is lower semicontinuous. Indeed, there is an N (e.g., the largest n k in (14) over (m, k) ∈ A i ) such that W i (x) is lower semicontinuous when x is restricted to Π n with n ≥ N . (It will even be lower semicomputable when x is restricted to Π ≥N .) And the operation sup preserves lower semicontinuity: Let us check that W i (2) ≤ 2 −m . Suppose that, on the contrary, W i (2) > 2 −m . Construct a forecasting system φ as follows. For each x ∈ Ω n , n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, choose φ(x) such that
. Combining the fact that
with the fact that the function x ∈ Ω → S(x) := W φ i (x) + n/N , where n is the length of x, is a submartingale w.r. to φ, we obtain
where E φ stands for the expectation of a function of ω ∈ Ω w.r. to P φ . The inequality between the extreme terms of (9) fails by the definition of a test of typicalness. Define V m (x) := sup i W i (x), x ∈ Π , to be the limit of the non-decreasing sequence of superfarthingales W i . It is clear that V m is also a superfarthingale and
this is a lower semicomputable superfarthingale with initial value V (2) ≤ 1 (so that V ∈ V if we redefine V (2) := 1).
Now it is easy to finish the proof of the theorem. Suppose that π is not typical. Then π ∈ G m for all m ∈ N. Then V (π n ) → ∞ as n → ∞, and so π is not unpredictable.
Conclusion
In this section we will discuss some open problems and directions of further research (for further open problems and background information, see [17] ).
Quantitative prequential randomness
Let U be the universal superfarthingale. Let us denote its binary logarithm log U (p 1 , y 1 , . . . , p n , y n ) by DU(p 1 , y 1 , . . . , p n , y n ) and call it the deficiency of unpredictability of (p 1 , y 1 , . . . , p n , y n ). For π ∈ Π, set DU(π) := sup n DU(π n ). Let T be the universal test of typicalness. Let us denote its value T (ω, φ) by DT(ω, φ) and call it the deficiency of typicalness. The deficiency of typicalness DT(π) of π ∈ Π can now be defined as inf φ DT(ω, φ), φ ranging over the forecasting systems that agree with π. We can further define DT(p 1 , y 1 , . . . , p n , y n ) as the infimum of DT(π), π ∈ Π ranging over all continuations of (p 1 , y 1 , . . . , p n , y n ).
In this paper we have demonstrated the equivalence of unpredictability and typicalness in the prequential setting: DU(π) < ∞ if and only if DT(π) < ∞. A natural next step is to study inequalities between the deficiency of unpredictability and the deficiency of typicalness. The arguments of this paper show that DU ≈ DT. It would be interesting to establish optimal explicit inequalities.
Stripped algorithmic theory of randomness
The non-algorithmic counterpart of the notion of randomness is Cournot's principle (see, e.g., [20] ): a data sequence is not random if it belongs to a pre-specified event of small probability. Therefore, the non-algorithmic counterpart of equivalence of various notions of randomness is the closeness of various notions of probability. As the notion of randomness branches into unpredictability and typicalness, the notion of probability branches into game-theoretic probability and measure-theoretic probability. Unfortunately, the equivalence of unpredictability and typicalness does not translate automatically into equivalence between gametheoretic and measure-theoretic probability. In this subsection we will give some definitions, and in the next will state an open problem.
Measure-theoretic probability, as formalized by Kolmogorov [11] , is standard. The game-theoretic approach to probability is as old as measure-theoretic (see, e.g., von Mises [16] and Ville [22] ) but game-theoretic probability was formalized only recently [23, 7, 21] . Game-theoretic probability can be introduced as either upper or lower probability; its natural home is the prequential framework.
If E is a prequential event (i.e., a subset of Π), the upper probability of E is P(E) := inf : ∃V : V (2) = and ∀π ∈ Π : lim sup
where V ranges over the non-negative farthingales. It is clear that nothing changes if lim sup is replaced by sup or lim inf (we can always stop when 1 is reached) and/or if we allow V to range over the non-negative superfarthingales.
The lower probability of E is defined as
where E c is the complement of E. The exact probability of E exists if P(E) = P(E) and is equal to this common value.
Open problem
Consider the situation where the forecaster's prediction y n is restricted to a finite set F n ⊆ [0, 1] (the most interesting case is where F n is a grid of points in [0, 1] becoming more and more dense as n → ∞; alternatively, we could consider F n := Q ∩ [0, 1] instead of finite F n ). The sample space, denoted
is the set of all possible sequences of predictions and actual outcomes. For each set E ⊆ Π, we can define its upper probability P(E) as before, by (10) . We can also give the following "dual" definition, in the spirit of [10] , Section 10.2. For each forecasting system φ, let P φ be the probability distribution on Π corresponding to the following process: p 1 is chosen according to φ (p 1 := φ(2)), then y 1 is chosen according to the Bernoulli distribution with parameter p 1 , then p 2 is chosen according to φ (p 2 := φ(y 1 )), then y 2 is chosen according to the Bernoulli distribution with parameter p 2 , etc. Set P * (E) := sup φ P φ (E).
We are mostly interested in the case of a Borel E, in which case the notation P φ (E) is unambiguous. In general, P φ (E) can be understood to be the outer measure of E. Question 1. Suppose E is Borel. Is it true that P(E) = P * (E)?
The argument of this paper shows that for open E the answer is "yes". As a next step, it would be interesting to find the answer for closed E and other E in the low classes of the Borel hierarchy (such as Σ 
Randomized forecasting systems
In this paper we only considered deterministic forecasting systems. It would be interesting to extend Theorem 1 and its future quantitative and non-algorithmic versions (as discussed in the previous subsections) to the case of randomized forecasting systems.
